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To attorneys not participating in an appeal, terse
decisions have a certain satisfaction and are mildly humorous. If the Supreme Court can dispose of a contested
appeal in a half page decision, the attorneys for the appellant should have been smart enough to foresee the simpliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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city of the questions and the ease with which the court
would dispose of the appeal. Hence, other attorneys are
mildly amused that counsel get so wrapped up in their
view of the case that they cannot appreciate its insignificance.
A terse disposition of a case on appeal suggests three
alternatives:
(1) The amount involved is so small as not to be
worth the court's attention.
( 2) The questions involved are so obvious as not
to require discussion.
(3) The court has misconceived the basis of the
appeal.
As to the first point and its application to the case
at hand, there may be some merit, since the appeal involves some $1,700.00. This, however, is a question for
the legislature and up to now with cases arising in the
District Court the right of appeal has not been limited.
( 2) The case may be so simple as to present no
reasonable doubt. It was obviously on this basis that the
court disposed of the cause as it cited only two cases, the
principles of both of which are conceded by appellant~
in the briefs, are conceded now and were roneeded in the
District Court.
The court says, "there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support such conclusion under familiar principles enunciated by this court," the conelusion lwing thnt
the plaintiff and respondent "owned tlw pipe pnrrha~Pd
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
with hi~ 1noney." The court cites Toomer's Estate v.
Union Pacific Railroad, 239 Pac. 2d, 163. At page 165
this court said, "'The jury, having found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff, he is entitled to have us consider
all of the evidence, and every inference and intendment
fairly arising therefron1 in the light 1nost favorable to
him." \Vith this statement of the law there is no quarrel.
The question appellant raised was whether there was any
competent or credible evidence to support the trial court.
On the second question in the case involving confusion of goods, the court cites ~llanti City Savings Bank v.
Peterson, 33 Utah 209, 93 Pac. 566, which holds that
where leased sheep are inter1ningled with sheep of the
lessee and are not capable of identification the lessor and
lessee becmne tenants in cmnmon. There is no dispute
as to this staten1ent of the law. The question raised by
the appeal was, assuming the intermingling of personal
property so as to result in a confusion of goods or tenancy in common, what right does one of the parties have
to divide the property and control his own share, leaving
the other party to worry about his own 1 The opinion
doesn't even recognize this question. Manti Bank v.
Peterson holds an owner has the right of replevin, where
all preliminaries are met, and does not charge the segregator with responsibility for the balance.
(3) The court has misconceived the basis of the
appeal. The Com;;titution of the State of Utah does not
require elaborate opinions fron1 the Supreme Court but
~ays in Article VIII, Section 25, that "the reasons therefor shall he stated concisely in writing* * *."
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If the Supreme Court has followed this constitutional exhortation then it has not decided the case presented by appellant, because its reasons do not deal with
either of the questions raised on the appeal.
It is our view that appellant is entitled to a decision
on whether the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff is
credible and probative, or whether, as contended by the
appellant, it was composed entirely of gratuitous and
incompetent statements of ultimate fact, shown by the
evidence of the respondent himself to have been based
upon surmise and wishfulness, the statement being completely destroyed by the foundation evidence in the case.
We are not so wasteful of client's money and our reputation that we would appeal a case on a question of fact
with conflicting, con1petent evidence. We believe we are
entitled also to a decision as to the rights of a person
whose personal property has become confused with that
of others, and not simply a statement that where goods
have been confused each of the contributors owns a fractional part thereof, and that proceeds from a sale shall be
divided proportionately. rrhat is only the beginning of
the problem. Realizing that this is the law generally,
is it not also the law in F tah that an owner of intermingled and confused goods has the right to make a
segregation, controlling his own property and ignoringthe balance T
If the court in a terse decision would state its answers to these two questions, at least the law woulrl ht·
made plain. Counsel for a litigant are entitled to rPly
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on decided cases in advising their clients, and are entitled to assu1ne that this court will state that they have
misconceived the law, that the facts do not support their
contention, or that new law is being established.
Does the court 1nean to hold, that where two owners
of drill pipe haYl' inter1ningled their indistinguishable
pieces of pipe, the only remedy either one has is to sell
all or a part of the pipe and hold the proceeds in the same
proportion as the original pile of pipe~ Does the court
mean to suggest that the appellant had no right to go to
Vernal, litah, and take possession of his proper share of
the intenningled pipe, leaving the rest where it was~
Or does the court hold in its decision that appellant is to
be punished because in segregating the pipe he mistakenly took nwre than his proper share 1 Our view of the
facts and the law is that if appellant had segregated only
his proper share the respondent would have received
nothing and could not complain because of his own negligence. Appellant's mistake in segregating more than his
proper share has actually benefitted the respondent, because the surplus is available to respondent.
rrhe court sustains the finding that respondent owned
25.17% of the confused mass. That means appellant
owned 74.83% of the pipe piled in the rig after the well
was abandoned. The trial court found there was 5,890
feet of good pipe worth $1.50 per foot. Of this appellant
owned 74.83%, or the equivalent of 4,407.5 feet, worth

$6,611.25.
'Vhen the rig was being sold and dismantled appel-
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lant wanted to protect and did protect his share of the
pipe, as he had a right to do. (Cases cited by appellant
in his Brief, pp. 35-38.) This share was as specified, and
any arnount segregated in addition to his share was the
pipe of respondent. The tenancy in common was terminated and all of appellant's share was in the pile segregated. The pipe left in the rig was respondent's alone
and the loss of it was respondent's loss.
Therefore the proceeds of sale of the segregated
pipe belonged $6,611.25 to appellant, and the balance to
respondent, after making proportionate reductions for
the cost of keeping and expenses of sale. Appellant's
share was 661125 ths, or 83.4%. Costs of sale and storage
of $815.00 (paid by appellant) should be apportioned accordingly. 16.6% of that amount or $135.29 is chargeable
to respondent. Therefore, assuming the good pipe to be
only in the amount found by the trial court, respondent
should be allowed a maxirnum of $1,173.83, and appellant
should retain the remainder.
The law seems to us to be definite that partial owners of confused goods have the right of segregation, including the right to accomplish the segregation hy replevin action. Assuming this right, there is no authority
cited by the court or by the respondent that a party nding in good faith will be penalized because he took morP
than his share. The cases properly hold that only the :-~ur
plus portion is held for the benefit of the other part~·.
We cannot compel a re-hearing, but submit that thP
court has not decided the questions presented hy the
record on appeal.
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to the other point raised by the record, namely,
"'Yho owned the pipe?'', the court might very well be
ten1pted to say, there is no evidence that appellant owned
the pipe and appellant therefore cannot complain if the
true owner failed to con1e forth and establish his ownership. Or the court might conceivably say, the evidence
supporting respondent would not be sufficient to establish ownership against nf. E. Baird or Baird and Robbins Company, but as against appellant the court is not
disposed to be too fussy. Such an attitude might not
~ati~fy appellant, but at least it would lay the matter at
re~t. The inappropriate statement of the court in this
case simply indicates that this court is not concerned with
the difference between credible and probative evidence
and evidence which is known by the witness to be false
and without foundation, and right in the teeth of the
basic facts in the case which establish ownership of the
pipe in Baird and Robbins Drilling Company. The name
of Johnson was never used in the purchase of the pipe,
and .Johnson's loan of money to Baird and Robbins was
definitely and finally resolved in a promissory note with
a ~ecurity guarantee, which is Exhibit "C", and which
establishes Baird and Robbins as the owner of the pipe
in a docun1ent produced by respondent from his own
possession and E'Ubmitted as the controlling document in
the case.
Thi~ i~

the question on ownership: A loaned $2,-

500.00 to R to enable B to buy drill pipe. B purchased
the pipe in his own name (under a rental or purchase
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option) and proceeded to use it. B later agreed in writing
to repay A $2,800.00 and to keep the pipe on the premises
until the loan is repaid. B went broke and abandoned
the premises, leaving the drill pipe in place. Does A own
the pipe~ If the court thinks so, it sliould say so, and
not duck the question by saying the evidence is conflicting. For A to testify, with the above the admitted facts,
that he owns the pipe, cannot be evidence of ownership
but only a layman's claim of ownership. But if the court
accepts such a self-serving claim as evidence why should
it not say so~ That would be establishing law.
Appellant suggests that he is entitled to have the
court decide the case on the facts and law presented, and
not be shrugged off with an opinion which does not even
recognize the questions raised by the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS AND BIRD
Attorneys for Appellants
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